Sexually Oriented Businesses, the First Amendment, and the Supreme Court\u27s 1985-86 Term: The New Prerogatives of Local Community Control by Ziegler, Edward H., Jr.
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 32 Supreme Court Symposium
January 1987
Sexually Oriented Businesses, the First
Amendment, and the Supreme Court's 1985-86
Term: The New Prerogatives of Local Community
Control
Edward H. Ziegler Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Supreme Court Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open
Scholarship. For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Edward H. Ziegler Jr., Sexually Oriented Businesses, the First Amendment, and the Supreme Court's 1985-86 Term: The New Prerogatives of
Local Community Control, 32 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 123 (1987)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol32/iss1/5
SEXUALLY ORIENTED BUSINESSES, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT, AND THE
SUPREME COURT'S 1985-86 TERM: THE
NEW PREROGATIVES OF LOCAL
COMMUNITY CONTROL
EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Supreme Court decisions granting first amendment protection to
non-obscene but sexually explicit movies, books, magazines, and danc-
ing have created a number of difficult issues concerning the lawful
scope of local community control over businesses that deal in these
forms of expression.' Two of the more troublesome issues have been
* Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. A.B. 1970, University of
Notre Dame; J.D. 1973, University of Kentucky; LL.M. 1975, George Washington
University. The author gratefully acknowledges the support for the preparation of this
article provided by a faculty research grant from the University of Dayton.
1. See, e.g., Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975). See generally D.
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 5.39 (1982); Weinstein, Regulating Pornography: Re-
cent Legal Trends, in LAND USE LAW: ISSUES FOR THE EIGHTIES 205 (E.M. Netter ed.
1984).
Unlike books, movies, and theatrical dancing, courts are unlikely to rule that first
amendment protection of expression extends to the "conduct" of certain types of adult
uses like massage parlors, swing clubs, and escort services. The validity of licensing and
regulation of such businesses is based on the ordinary due process standards for validity
of police power enactements. See, e.g., Harper v. Lindsay, 616 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1980)
(massage parlors); People v. Morone, 150 Cal. App. 3d 18, 198 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1983)
(swing clubs); IDK, Inc. v. County of Clark, 599 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Nev. 1984) (escort
services).
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the validity of zoning location restrictions on sexually oriented busi-
nesses and the validity of nuisance abatement and license revocation
laws based on either illicit sexual activity or obscenity. During the
1985-86 term, the Supreme Court decided cases involving both of these
issues. In both cases, the Court upheld forms of regulatoin burdening
sexually explicit expression. The decisions, as precedents, clarify and
expand the prerogatives of local community control over sexually ori-
ented businesses.
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.2 the Supreme Court up-
held as constitutional a local zoning ordinance imposing special loca-
tion restrictions on adult theaters. Reversing the decision of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals on three separate issues, the Supreme Court
resolved all three issues in favor of local regulation. The Court clearly
rejected the rather strict interpretation of first amendment standards
for validity that courts had applied in recent years to hold such ordi-
nances unconstitutional. In Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.3 the Supreme
Court upheld as constitutional the enforcement of a generally applica-
ble nuisance abatement law to shut down the operation of an adult
bookstore for a one yar period based on illegal acts of prostitution on
the premises. Reversing the decision of the New York Court of Ap-
peals, the Court distinguished several earlier decisions and held that
first amendment scrutiny of a nuisance abatement law is neither re-
quired nor appropriate when such a law is neither directed at nor based
on activities that involve forms of protected expression. This article
discusses both of these decisions and their significance with respect to
the validity of location restrictions and nuisance abatement laws as ap-
plied to sexually oriented businesses.
II. LOCATION RESTRICTIONS
The Supreme Court's decision in City of Renton represents the third
time in ten years that the Court has ruled on the constitutionality of
zoning restrictions regulating the location of sexually oriented busi-
nesses. The significance of City of Renton is perhaps best understood
by examining the Court's two earlier decisions and the standards for
validity applied in a number of recent lower court decisions holding
location restrictions unconstitutional.
2. 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).
3. 106 S. Ct. 3172 (1986).
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A. Early Court Decisions
Ten years ago, the Supreme Court in Young v. American Mini Thea-
tres4 upheld as constitutional a Detroit ordinance that prohibited the
location of sexually oriented theaters, bookstores, and cabarets within
1,000 feet of two other such uses or within 500 feet of any residential
area. The ordinance defined regulated "adult" establishments as uses
distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matters depicting,
describing, or relating to specified sexual activities or specified anatom-
ical areaa as further defined therein. The Court held that the ordi-
nance was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to an "adults only"
movie theater that displayed sexually explicit films on a regular basis.5
More importantly, the Court held that while the ordinance singled
out sexually oriented businesses for special zoning treatment based on a
content classification, the ordinance did not violate the first amend-
ment or the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
Court found that Detroit's location restrictions on sexually oriented
businesses were valid as "content-neutral" time, place, and manner re-
strictions because the purpose for the ordinance was not to eliminate,
suppress, or censor the speech itself but to "preserve the quality of ur-
ban life" by avoiding "secondary effects" on the community, such as
neighborhood deterioration and increased crime rates, associated with
these businesses.6 The plurality opinion by Justice Stevens referred to
the "admittedly serious problems" created by adult theaters and
pointed out that the record indicated a "factual basis" for the city to
believe that the ordinance would further its asserted purpose.7 The
city's goal of avoiding the secondary effects of adult uses is one, the
Court found, that "must be accorded high respect" and is substantial
enough to justify the resulting incidental restriction on first amendment
expression. 8 The Court in Mini Theatres, however, pointed out that
the situation would be quite different if the ordinance was motivated
simply by a distaste for the content of the speech itself or if the ordi-
nance would have the effect of suppressing or greatly restricting access
to this form of expression.9
4. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
5. Id. at 61.
6. Id. at 70-71.
7. Id. at 55, 70-71.
8. Id. at 71.
9. Id. at 71-72, n.35.
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Five years later, the Court in Schad v. Mount of Ephraim1o held
unconstitutional a local ordinance that excluded all commercial live
entertainment from the community, including nonobscene nude danc-
ing. Distinguishing the "incidental burden" on protected expression
imposed by the ordinance in Mini Theatres, the Court pointed out that
the exclusionary ordinance in Schad imposed a "substantial restric-
tion" on a number of forms of protected expression." The Court
found the ordinance unconstitutional because the borough had
presented no evidence to support its burden of showing that exclusion
furthered some legitimate zoning purpose. In fact, it was neither "self-
evident" nor "immediately apparent as a matter of experience" that
live entertainment presented greater problems with regard to parking,
trash, or police protection than other commercial uses such as restau-
rants, adult bookstores, and taverns allowed in the borough. 2 Fur-
thermore, the Schad Court pointed out that even if some forms of live
entertainment presented special problems not associated with other
permitted commercial uses, the ordinance was unduly restrictive be-
cause the borough may have been able to address such problems by
more selective, less burdensome controls. 13
The Supreme Court's decisions in Mini Theatres and Schad estab-
lished an analytical framework for determining the constitutionality of
local ordinances regulating the location of protected forms of sexually
explicit expression. Under Mini Theatres, a local ordinance designed
to control the "secondary effects" of adult uses through special loca-
tion restrictions would be valid at least when the regulation did not
directly limit the number of uses or greatly restrict access to such uses.
Under Schad, a local ordinance that excludes sexually explicit forms of
protected expression from a community would be subject to closer ju-
dicial scrutiny both as to whether the alleged purposes for exclusion
are actually furthered by the ordinance and as to whether the ordi-
nance is unduly restrictive.
B. Later Litigation
Local government officials construed the Supreme Court's decision
in Mini Theatres as opening the door for widespread adoption of local
10. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
11. Id. at 72.
12. Id. at 73-74.
13. Id. at 74.
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zoning regulations that imposed special location restrictions on adult
uses. Later ordinances, however, generally did not fare well in post-
Mini Theatres litigation. Although courts held the ordinances uncon-
stitutional on a number of grounds, the later decisions appeared to
close the door to regulation by applying a rather strict interpretation of
the first amendment standards for validity established in Mini Theatres.
For example, some later court decisions held such ordinances uncon-
stitutional because the local community had not met its burden of dem-
onstrating that the ordinance would further the public purpose of
controlling the secondary effects of the adult uses regulated.' 4 These
courts ruled that a "factual basis" in the record must support adult
business regulation. This basis consists of testimony by sociologists
and urban planners or planning studies that demonstrates how the or-
dinance would control the "secondary effects" of adult uses in view of
local conditions existing in the particular community. Most federal
courts adopted this view of a city's burden of proof, focusing on the
Supreme Court's "factual basis" language in Mini Theatres to support
the local ordinances. 15
Courts also held zoning location restrictions unconstitutional when
the ordinance was motivated in part by a desire to suppress the sexu-
ally explicit speech itself.16 In some cases in which courts found an
improper intent to suppress, they did not directly address the issue of
whether an otherwise valid ordinance would be upheld unless the im-
proper intent was the primary or predominate factor in enactment.
Courts addressing this issue, however, ruled that when mixed munici-
pal motives existed, the fact that improper intent to suppress was sim-
ply "a motivating factor" would alone be sufficient to invalidate the
ordinance. 17
In addition, a number of decisions held location restrictions uncon-
stitutional because the restrictive ordinance had the effect of sup-
pressing or greatly restricting public access to sexually explicit
14. See, e.g., 754 Orange Ave., Inc. v. City of New Haven, 761 F.2d 105, 112 (2d
Cir. 1985); Krueger v. City of Pensacola, 759 F.2d 851, 855 (11th Cir. 1985); Avalon
Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 667 F.2d 659, 661 (8th Cir. 1981).
15. See 427 U.S. at 71.
16. See, e.g., Ebel v. City of Corona, 698 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1983); CLR Corp. v.
Henline, 702 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1983); Avalon Cinema Corp. v. Thompson, 667 F.2d
659 (8th Cir. 1981).
17. See, e.g., Krueger v. City of Pensacola, 759 F.2d 851, 852 (11th Cir. 1985);
Tovar v. Billmeyer, 721 F.2d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 223
(1984).
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speech."8 These decisions held that location restrictions have the effect
of suppressing or greatly restricting public access to adult uses when a
substantial number of "allowed locations" under the ordinance are not
"realistically available" to a "reasonably prudent investor" desiring to
operate this type of retail commercial use within the community.1 9
These decisions closely examined the "suitability" of allowed locations
to determine whether the locations were commerically feasible and de-
sirable sites for adult-type retail uses. The courts considered factors
such as accessibility, the nature of nearby uses, the present availability
and occupancy of suitable buildings, and the cost of construction or
conversion.2°
The decision of the Court Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, reversed by
the Supreme Court in City of Renton, relied on all three of the above
described grounds to hold Renton's location restriction ordinance
unconstitutional.2
C. Background of City of Renton
The city of Renton, Washington has a population of approximately
32,000 people and a land area of over sixteen square miles. Renton has
a typical mix of land uses including, in addition to residential areas, a
substantial number and variety of retail-commercial uses as well as
manufacturing and other industrial uses. Prior to the location of any
sexually-oriented business in Renton, the city council in 1981 enacted a
zoning ordinance imposing special location restrictions on adult thea-
ters. The ordinance prohibited such uses from locating within 1,000
feet of any residential zone, single or multi-family dwelling, church, or
park, and within one mile of any school. Under the ordinance's dis-
18. See, e.g., Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982) (con-
fining potential sites to poorly lit industrial zones a great distance from other consumer-
oriented uses drastically impairs public access); International Food & Beverage Sys. v.
City of Fort Lauderdale, 614 F. Supp. 1517 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (majority of potential sites
patently unsuitable because on the outskirts of town near an airport and the city well-
fields); North Street Book Shoppe, Inc. v. Village of Endicott, 582 F. Supp. 1428
(N.D.N.Y. 1984) (potential sites in industrial zones where suitable buildings presently
occupied by other retail uses and costs of conversion or construction of suitable building
were prohibitive); Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(most potential sites either wholly unacceptable to reasonably prudent investor or pres-
ently unavailable due to existing uses).
19. See supra note 18.
20. Id.
21. Playtime Theaters, Inc. v. City of Renton, 748 F.2d 527, 534-35 (1984), rev'd,
City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 928-29 (1986).
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tancing requirements, the two existing movie theaters in the city were
not allowed locations for such uses.
In January 1982, Playtime Theaters acquired the two existing thea-
ters in the city and brought suit in federal court challenging the consti-
tutionality of the location restrictions in Renton's ordinance. While
this suit was pending, the city amended its ordinance, adding a detailed
statement of reasons for its enactment and reducing the minimum dis-
tance from any school to 1,000 feet. Thereafter, the trial court denied
Playtime's request for a permanent injunction and entered summary
judgment in favor of Renton, upholding the constitutionality of the or-
dinance as amended.
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and held
that Renton had not met its burden of demonstrating a factual basis to
prove the ordinance would control the secondary effects of adult thea-
ters in view of "the particular problems and needs of Renton."22 On
this point, the court ruled that Renton could not rely simply on the
experience of, or studies relating to, other cities such as Detroit or Seat-
tle, but must "justify its ordinance in the context of Renton's
problems."23 The court found the detailed purposes for enactment set
out in the amended ordinance, relating to controlling the secondary
effects of adult theaters, were merely "conclusory and speculative" ad
hoe justifications for enactment.2 4
The court of appeals also held the ordinance unconstitutional on the
ground that a motivating factor in Renton's enactment of the ordi-
nance appeared to be the city's intent to suppress the speech itself.
This inference was drawn from several statements of purpose in the
ordinance relating to the offensiveness of the content of such speech
and the lack of a specific factual basis for the ordinance. The court
ruled that when "mixed motives" were present, an ordinance would be
unconstitutional even if a city's predominate concerns in enactment re-
lated to controlling the secondary effects of adult theaters.25
The court of appeals further held that Renton's ordinance consti-
tuted a substantial restriction on speech, rather than merely the inci-
dental burden involved in Mini Theatres, because the effect of the
ordinance would be to suppress and greatly restrict public access to
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adult theaters.26 The court found that a substantial part of the 520
acres of land (five percent of the city) that the Renton ordinance left
open for adult theaters was not presently suitable and available for this
type of retail commercial use. Much of this land was already occupied
by buildings suitable only for industrial use, a race track, a sewage dis-
posal plant, a warehouse and manufacturing facilities, an oil tank farm,
and a fully developed shopping center.
D. The City of Renton Decision
The Supreme Court in a 7-2 decision reversed the court of appeals
and expressly rejected all three of the lower court's rulings on the con-
stitutionality of the ordinance. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the ma-
jority, relied on Mini Theatres to hold that because the Renton
ordinance did not completely ban adult theaters but simply regulated
their location, the ordinance should be analyzed as a form of time,
place, and manner regulation of this form of expression. Again citing
Mini Theatres, the court found the ordinance content-neutral despite
the special location treatment accorded adult theaters because the ordi-
nance was not directed at the content of films shown at adult theaters
but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding
community. The appropriate test for validity, the Court stated, "is
whether the Renton ordinance is designed to serve a substantial gov-
ernmental interest and allows for reasonable alternative avenues of
communication. '27
After referring to the amended ordinance's statement of purposes
relating to prevention of crime, protection of the city's retail trade,
maintenance of property values, and protection of the quality of the
city's neighborhoods and commercial districts, the Court found that
the city designed the ordinance to serve the substantial public purpose
of attempting "to preserve the quality of urban life," an interest that
must be accorded "high respect.", 28 The Court also found that the
Renton ordinance left open "reasonable alternative avenues of commu-
nication" for this form of expression because the allowed locations
under the ordinance provided adult theaters "a reasonable opportunity
to open and operate" within the city.29
26. Id. at 524.
27. 106 S. Ct. at 929.
28. Id. at 930.
29. Id. at 932.
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The Supreme Court further ruled that unlike the situation in Schad,
the Renton ordinance was "narrowly tailored" to achieve its goals be-
cause it would affect only those theaters shown to produce the un-
wanted secondary effects."° The Court also found that while the
ordinance did not regulate other types of adult uses, it was not imper-
missible as an underinclusive regulation. No other types of adult busi-
nesses were located or planning to locate in Renton, and no reason
existed to believe that Renton would not amend its ordinance in the
future to include other types of adult uses shown to produce the same
kinds of secondary effects as adult theaters. 3'
Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justice Marshall, and would
have ruled the ordinance unconstitutional as a content-based restric-
tion on protected speech; in effect, rearguing Mini Theatres' characteri-
zation of special location restrictions on adult uses as a form of
content-neutral regulation.32 In Justice Brennan's view, the city failed
to adequately demonstrate that the ordinance would further the alleged
purposes for regulation and that the alleged secondary effects of adult
theaters could not be addressed effectively by less intrusive measures.
Moreover, according to Justice Brennan, the ordinance failed even if
classified as a content-neutral, time, place, and manner restriction be-
cause much of the land available under the ordinance for adult theater
use was either already occupied or unsuitable for such use. Thus, the
ordinance had the effect of denying this form of protected speech a
reasonable opportunity to locate within the community.3 3
E. Effect As Precedent
The Supreme Court's decision in City of Renton clearly reopens the
door that had been partially closed in post-Mini Theatres litigation
holding adult use location restrictions unconstitutional. Expressly re-
jecting all three rulings of the court of appeals, the City of Renton deci-
sion undermines the precedential effect of a number of post-Mini
Theatres decisions that relied on one or more of these rulings. The
Supreme Court's decision and its effect as precedent on each of these
issues, is set out below.
30. Id. at 931.
31. Id. at 931-32.
32. Id. at 933.
33. Id. at 938.
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1. Substantial Public Purpose
With respect to the issue of whether the city had met its burden of
showing that the location restriction ordinance furthers a substantial
public purpose, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the appellate
court's finding that the Renton ordinance was enacted without the ben-
efit of studies specifically relating to the problems or needs of Renton.
Such a standard for validity, the Court held, imposes on a city an un-
necessarily rigid burden of proof. 4 The Court ruled that a city may
properly rely on the experience of, and studies produced by, other cities
such as Detroit or Seattle in regard to the secondary effects of adult
theaters. On this point the Court stated: "The First Amendment does
not require a city, before enacting such an ordinance, to conduct new
studies or produce evidence independent of that already generated by
other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reason-
ably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses."35
Furthermore, cities "must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to ex-
periment with solutions to admittedly serious problems." A court's
function is not "to appraise the wisdom" of a city's decision to concen-
trate adult theaters, as in Renton, rather than to disperse such uses, as
in Detroit.36 Pointing out that at the time of enactment the Renton
city council had before it the Washington Supreme Court's opinion in
Northend Cinema, Inc. v. Seattle,37 which summarized Seattle's studies
and findings relating to the secondary effects of adult theaters, the
Court held that a reasonable basis existed for Renton to believe that the
ordinance would further its stated purposes even though its ordinance
as enacted was not identical to Seattle's. 38
City of Renton makes clear that cities no longer have the burden to,
as one lower court recently put it, "reinvent the wheel' 39 every time an
34. Id. at 930.
35. Id. at 931.
36. Id.
37. 90 Wash. 2d 709, 713, 585 P.2d 1153, 1156 (1978), cerL denied, Apple Theater,
Inc. v. Seattle, 441 U.S. 946 (1979).
38. 106 S. Ct. at 931.
39. International Food & Beverage Sys. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 614 F. Supp.
1517, 1521 (S.D. Fla. 1985). Commenting on "conventional thinking" in regard to a
city's burden of proof in regulating adult uses, the federal district court stated:
Any local government can hire a group of experts to say that "adult" entertain-
ment produces undesirable consequences. To perpetuate the legal fiction that a city
must first establish objective evidence in support of a legitimate reason for enacting
a zoning regulation ignores the basic truth that "adult" entertainment causes simi-
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adult use location ordinance is enacted. Under the City of Renton rul-
ing, a city council may now rely on the experience and findings of other
cities, as summarized in court opinions such as Mini Theatres and
Northend Cinema, to enact an ordinance like Renton's to either dis-
perse or concentrate adult uses. Moreover, because the factual basis
for regulation in Mini Theatres related to a variety of sexually-oriented
businesses,"° the City of Renton ruling on a city's burden of proof
would seem applicable to regulation of other types of adult uses, in-
cluding adult bookstores and cabarets. Rather than a significant limi-
tation on the use of such studies, the Supreme Court's statement that
cities may rely on such studies as long as they are "reasonably believed
to be relevant" may actually serve more as a shield to insulate adult use
zoning decisions from second guessing by reviewing courts when issues
of relevance and zoning policy are fairly debatable. In this respect, the
Supreme Court's ruling on a city's burden of showing that a location
restriction ordinance furthers a substantial public purpose directly par-
allels the Court's earlier rulings on local regulation of signs and bill-
boards. These earlier rulings outline the judicial deference to be
accorded a reasonably plausible legislative judgment that such regula-
tion will promote a city's interests in aesthetics and traffic safety.41
2. Intent To Suppress
In City of Renton the Supreme Court expressly rejected the appellate
court's ruling that when intent to suppress speech itself is simply "a
motivating factor" for enactment, the ordinance is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court held that as long as a city's predominate concerns
relate to controlling the secondary effects of adult uses, regulation
should not be held invalid on the basis of an improper intent to sup-
press the speech itself.4' In this respect the Court relied on its earlier
decision in United States v. O'Brien, which stated that a court should
"not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an
alleged illicit legislative motive."43
lar problems in municipalities of similar composition and character. Local gover-
ments should not have to reinvent the wheel every time a zoning ordinance is
enacted....
Id.
40. 427 U.S. at 52 n.3.
41. See Los Angeles City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984);
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
42. 106 S. Ct. at 929.
43. 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968).
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The ruling in City of Renton on this issue is significant for a number
of reasons. The issue of improper legislative intent to suppress with
regard to adult use location restrictions is usually deemed to be a tria-
ble issue of fact, properly determined by relevant objective circum-
stances such as the language in the ordinance, the effect of regulation,
comparison to prior law, the record of proceedings, and the facts sur-
rounding enactment. 4 As a first amendment standard for validity, the
Supreme Court in City of Renton makes clear that a location ordinance
should be held unconstitutional only when a city's primary concern in
enactment is an intent to suppress the speech itself. In addition, the
Supreme Court approved of the district court's finding that Renton's
predominate concerns related to controlling the secondary effects of
adult uses and were unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
The lower court arrived at this finding even though Renton had not
independently demonstrated a factual legislative basis for the ordi-
nance prior to enactment and had included a number of findings in the
ordinance itself that clearly expressed a distaste for the subject matter
regulated.
In post-Mini Theatres litigation, a number of courts had relied on
just such an absence of a legislative factual basis for regulation along
with official expressions of dislike for the subject matter to find an im-
proper legislative intent to suppress the speech itself.45 Read together,
City of Renton's rulings on a city's burden of proof and improper intent
to suppress may undercut any presumptive finding of an invalidating
legislative intent to suppress based simply on the absence of a detailed
factual basis for regulation and expressions of dislike for the subject
matter. Similarly, the Court's ruling on the reasonable alternative lo-
cations issue would seem to undercut any presumed finding of an im-
proper legislative motive based simply on the fact that many allowed
locations for adult uses are either already occupied or not commer-
cially viable.
3. Reasonable Alternative Locations
The Supreme Court in City of Renton expressly rejected the appel-
late court's finding that the 520 acres left open for adult uses was not
truly "available" land and, therefore, imposed a substantial restriction
44. See City of Las Vegas v. Foley, 747 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1984).
45. See, e.g., CLR Corp. v. Henline, 702 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1983); Entertainment
Concepts, Inc. v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 450 U.S. 919
(1981).
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on speech by greatly restricting public access to adult theaters. The
Court accepted the finding of the trial court that the 520 acres con-
sisted of "ample, accessible real estate" crisscrossed by freeways, high-
ways, and roads.46 The Court rejected Playtime's argument that the
no commercially viable adult theater sites were available due to the fact
that existing businesses already occupied some of the acreage and that
most of the undeveloped land was not currently for sale or lease.
Pointing out that the inquiry for first amendment purposes does not
involve economic impact, the Court stated that Renton had met its
obligation under Mini Theatres by providing "reasonable opportunity
to open and operate an adult theater within the city."'4 7 The Court
observed that because adult theaters "must fend for themselves in the
real estate market, on an equal footing with other prospective purchas-
ers and lessees, does not give rise to a First Amendment violation."4 8
No obligation exists "to insure that adult-theaters, or any other kinds
of speech related business for that matter, will be able to obtain sites at
bargain prices."'4 9
As precedent, the Court's decision that the Renton ordinance easily
met the test of providing reasonable alternative locations for adult the-
aters within the community significantly undercuts the rationale of a
number of post-Mini Theatres decisions holding location restrictions
unconstitutional.:o Under the City of Renton holding, as long as the
land zoned for an adult use is ample and accessible, the fact that many
potential sites are not realistically available because they are already
occupied, not for sale or lease, or not commercially viable is irrelevant
for first amendment analysis." The Court's ruling on this issue ap-
pears to leave cities with the discretion to zone adult uses to the out-
skirts of town, where many potential sites are either undeveloped or
occupied, as long as these locations are ample and accessible.5 2 Re-
jecting the economic impact of available sites on adult use owners as
the test for validity,53 City of Renton clearly rejects a "presently avail-
able for a reasonably prudent investor" standard to determine whether




50. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
51. 106 S. Ct. at 932.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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an ordinance provides reasonable alternative locations for an adult use
within a community.
City of Renton indicates that courts should strike down only the
most restrictive adult use location ordinance as suppressing or greatly
restricting public access to adult uses. Perhaps, as in Basiardanes v.
City of Galveston,54 when the city concentrates potential sites for adult
uses in industrial zones with few roads, poor lighting, and only ware-
houses, shipyards, undeveloped areas, and swamps, City ofRenton may
support a finding that the land available for adult use is not readily
accessible. Amortization ordinances that force the relocation of adult
uses may also be invalidated if the ordinances either prohibit new uses
or reduce the number of existing adult uses in a community to directly
suppress public access to this form of speech, or fail to provide ample
alternative locations for such uses.
F. Comments
City of Renton clarifies and reformulates the first amendment stan-
dards, established in Mini Theatres, that apply to adult use location
ordinances. A clear majority of the City of Renton Court reaffirmed
the earlier characterization of such ordinances as content-neutral time,
place, and manner restrictions on this form of expression. As reformu-
lated by the Court, such an ordinance will be upheld if it: (1) is
designed to serve a substantial governmental interest; and (2) allows for
reasonable alternative avenues of communication. While a number of
other constitutional grounds exist upon which courts might rely to
hold adult use location restrictions unconstitutional,56 the Supreme
54. 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982).
55. See Alexader v. City of Minneapolis, 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1982) (amortization
ordinance prohibiting new uses and reducing number of existing adult uses held uncon-
stitutional); Adult Bookstore v. City of Fresno, 758 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1985) (ordi-
nance held unconstitutional due to lack of relocation sites available to existing adult
uses).
In states that allow amortization of nonconforming uses, the courts may uphold
amortization of adult uses if the time period for termination of the use is reasonable and
the ordinance leaves alternative locations open for such use. See, e.g., Hart Bookstores
v. Edmisten, 612 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 929 (1980) (six month
amortization period upheld); Northend Cinema, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash. 2d
709, 585 P.2d 1153 (1978) (90 day amortization period upheld).
56. In post-Mini Theatres litigation, court decisions have invalidated ordinances on
constitutional grounds that City of Renton not directly address. In some cases, courts
have held facially neutral ordinances unenforceable due to selective and discriminatory
application to adult uses. See, e.g., E.-Bru, Inc. v. Graves, 566 F. Supp. 1476 (D.N.J.
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Court's decision clearly undermines the rationale of a number of post-
Mini Theatres decisions and grants a much greater degree of discretion
and control to local communities in regulating the location of adult
uses.
City of Renton did not expressly address the constitutionality of an
ordinance that completely excludes adult uses from a community. The
requirement of providing "reasonable alternative locations" is simply
the second prong of the test of a content-neutral time, place, and man-
ner restriction that incidentally burdens adult uses within a commu-
nity. The Court clearly would have held such an ordinance
unconstitutional under the stricter scrutiny for a total exclusion re-
quired by Schad, based on the amount of undeveloped land available
and the number and types of commercial uses existing within Renton.
At least five Justices in Schad, however, indicated that they might up-
hold a total ban in certain circumstances,57 presumably when a com-
munity is largely developed and residential in character. In such a
case, the city would no doubt be required to produce a factual legisla-
tive record to support such exclusion and demonstrate that exclusion is
the least restrictive means of achieving legitimate planning objectives.58
As a final comment, the extent of control granted by the City of Ren-
ton Court to local communities with respect to the location of adult
uses surprised even those persons who expected a favorable ruling on
the ordinance. More than a little truth exists in Justice Brennan's as-
sertion that the majority opinion nearly invites local communities to
1983) (denial of license for adult bookstore improper since parking restrictions not en-
forced against other businesses). Ordinances have been held unconstitutional when nar-
rowly drawn and objective standards for guiding officials in issuing licenses or permits
were not established. See, e.g., 15192 Thirteen Mile Rd. v. City of Warren, 593 F. Supp.
147 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (standards for special permit and site plan review held invalid
prior restraints on first amendment rights); Little v. City of Greenfield, 575 F. Supp. 656
(E.D. Wis. 1983) (question whether adult use is compatible with nearby development or
contrary to general welfare does not sufficiently establish standards for regulating first
amendment rights). Courts have also held ordinances unconstitutional on grounds of
vagueness and overbreadth. See, e.g., Purple Onion, Inc. v. Jackson, 511 F. Supp. 1207
(N.D. Ga. 1981) (definition of adult bookstore would include federal courthouse); Mor-
ris v. Municipal Court, 32 Cal. 3d 553, 652 P.2d 51 (1982) (ordinance prohibiting nude
entertainment except in establishments devoted to "theatrical performances" presump-
tively overbroad).
57. Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). The concurring opinions of Jus-
tices Powell, Stewart, and Stevens and the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Burger,
joined by Justice Rehnquist, all indicated that a total ban on commercial entertainment
might be upheld in certain circumstances.
58. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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attempt to suppress adult uses in a community by imposing restrictive
location controls. Adult use location ordinances such as Renton's,
however, clearly are unlikely to eliminate or significantly curtail public
access to sexually explicit forms of expression. In a relative context,
the City of Renton decision simply "cools the heels" of lower federal
courts whose decisions in recent years had reached the point of grant-
ing new pornography businessses greater first amendment protection
than that accorded to new churches or religious uses. 59
III. NUISANCE CLOSURE AND LICENSE REVOCATION
In recent years, local communities have attempted to control the op-
eration of adult uses through nuisance closure and license revocation
proceedings. If successful, these proceedings may shut down an adult
business at its present location for a specified period of time or revoke
an adult use owner's business license to operate within the community.
Enforcement of such laws is usually based on either sale or exhibition
of obscene materials or a finding that the adult use owner permitted
illegal sexual activities on the premises. Nuisance closure and license
revocation laws as applied to adult uses have been the subject of much
recent litigation concerning whether these laws constitute unconstitu-
tional prior restraints on nonobscene but sexually explicit protected ex-
pression or whether they otherwise violate the first amendment.
During the 1985-86 term, the Supreme Court in Arcara v. Cloud
Books, Inc. 60 upheld the enforcement of a nuisance closure law to shut
down an adult bookstore for a one-year period based on illicit sexual
activities on the premises. The decision in Arcara is significant because
59. For example, compare the sensitivity of the federal courts to the economic im-
pact of regulation and the suitability of allowed locations with respect to adult use loca-
tion ordinances, noted supra at note 18, with Lakewood Congregation of Jehovah's
Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 307 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 72 (1983), which upheld the constitutionality of an ordinance prohibiting new
churches in nearly 90% of the city. The Lakewood court ruled that the "incidental
economic burden" was irrelevant and that the first amendment "does not require the
city to make all land or even the cheapest or most beautiful land available to churches."
Id.
Similarly, compare the requirement of a demonstrated factual basis for enactement of
an adult use location ordinance, noted supra at note 14, with the absence of such a first
amendment standard for validity in Lakewood and Holy Spirit Ass'n for Unification of
World Christianity v. Town of New Castle, 480 F. Supp. 1212, 1216 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(holding religious institutional use subject to same standards for grant of conditional use
permit as secular use, citing Mini-Theatres).
60. 106 S. Ct. 3172 (1986).
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it is the first Supreme Court decision to constitutionally bless this type
of law, and because the framework for analysis established by the
Court to adjudge the validity of such a law provides an important con-
text for analysis of first amendment and prior restraint issues when
municipalities impose similar forms of nuisance closure and license rev-
ocation laws against adult uses.
A. Legal Background
Nuisance closure and license revocation laws of the type involved in
Arcara generally operate to shut down an adult use or revoke its license
to operate based on past sale or exhibition of obscene materials or
knowing use of the premises for illicit sexual activities. These forms of
closure or revocation should be distinguished from so-called moral nui-
sance laws or proceedings that seek to enjoin the future sale or exhibi-
tion of named or unnamed obscene materials. The Supreme Court, in
Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.,61 expressly held that such an in-
junction constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on protected
speech, at least when the injunction would be violated without regard
to ultimate adjudication of the obscenity or nonobscenity of the subject
matter.
While the Supreme Court has never expressly addressed the consti-
tutionality of an injunction proceeding after defects like those noted in
Vance had been corrected, 62 a few later court decisions have upheld
such injunctions. 63 Other recent court decisions have upheld the con-
stitutionality of injunctions that prohibit the sale or exhibition of
materials already adjudged obscene under state law.' 4 The Supreme
Court has ruled that in the latter type of proceeding, obscenity may be
proved by "clear and convincing" evidence rather than the more strict
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.65
On the prior restraint issue, a leading case often cited is the early
decision of the Supreme Court in Near v. Minnesota.66 In Near the
Court held that enforcement of a nuisance statute enjoining a newspa-
61. 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
62. See Avenue Book Store v. City of Tallmadge, 459 U.S. 997, 998 (1982) (White,
J., dissenting to denial of certiorari).
63. E.g., Chateau X v. State, 302 N.C. 321, 275 S.E.2d 443 (1981).
64. E.g., City of Chicago v. Festival Theatre Corp., 91 111. 2d 295, 438 N.E.2d 159
(1982).
65. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros. Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 91-93 (1981).
66. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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per from publishing malicious, scandalous, or defamatory material was
an unconstitutional prior restraint on political expression. Speaking
for the Court, Chief Justice Hughes stated that if "the object of the
statute is not punishment, in the ordinary sense, but suppression of the
offending newspaper or periodical" in the future, and "the statute not
only operates to suppress the offending newspaper or periodical but to
put the publisher under an affective censorship," then the statute con-
stitutes a prior restraint.
67
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Arcara, the earlier decisions
of the Court in Vance and Near provided the controlling framework for
analysis of the restraint issue with regard to the enforcement of nui-
sance closure and licence revocation laws against adult uses. Also, be-
cause the Supreme Court had not yet directly addressed the
constitutionality of any of the various forms of closure or revocation
laws, some courts applied the first amendment standards set out in
United States v. O'Brien.68 Under the O'Brien rule, a law that inciden-
tally burdens protected expression will be upheld only if it furthers a
substantial public purpose unrelated to the suppression of protected
speech and is no more broad than necessary to achieve its purpose.6 9
In recent litigation, nuisance closure and license revocation laws
based on exhibition or sale of materials found to be obscene have met
with mixed results in the courts. While a few court decisions have up-
held such laws,7 ° most recent court decisions have ruled that such laws
are an unconstitutional prior restraint on sexually explicit protected
expression. 7 ' Conversely, nuisance closure laws based on illicit sexual
activities on the premises generally have been upheld in recent litiga-
tion.72 In addition, license revocation laws based on illicit sexual activ-
ities on the premises have posed problems for courts,73 even though a
67. Id. at 709-12.
68. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
69. Id. at 376-77.
70. See infra notes 91, 98 (Court decisions upholding such laws).
71. A compilation of court decisions that held obscenity-based nuisance closure and
license revocation laws unconstitutional is found in Cornflower Entertainment, Inc. v.
Salt Lake City Corp., 485 F. Supp. 777, 785 (D. Utah 1980).
72. See infra note 87 (court decisions upholding the constitutionality of nuisance
closure laws based on illicit sexual activities).
73. In some cases, courts have held license revocation ordinances unconstitutional
as applied to adult uses because of vagueness and a lack of specificity of standards for
taking such action. E.g., Barry v. City of Oceanside, 107 Cal. App. 3d 257, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1980) (city used standards of "public health, welfare, or safety").
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number of court decisions have upheld the constitutionality of such
laws.74
B. The Arcara Case
An adult bookstore located in Erie County, New York that sold sex-
ually explicit books and magazines and that had booths available for
viewing sexually explicit movies became the target of a police investiga-
tion into reports that illicit sexual activities were occurring on the
premises. The investigation found instances of solicitation of prostitu-
tion and other lewd conduct occurring on the premises with knowledge
of the proprietor. A civil complaint was brought against the owner,.
seeking closure of the premises for a one-year period under a New
York public health statute that defined as a nuisance and authorized
closure with respect to "any building, erection, or place used for the
purpose of lewdness, assignation or prostitution." Both the trial court
and appellate court rejected the defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, with both courts ruling that the statute applied to the premises in
question and that closure under the statute did not constitute an imper-
missible prior restraint on sexually explicit speech protected by the first
amendment. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals reversed.
While agreeing that the closure law applied not only to houses of pros-
titution but also to the premises in question, the New York court held
that closure of the bookstore would constitute a prior restraint on pro-
tected speech and that closure of the bookstore would not meet the
O'Brien test because the regulation, which incidentally burdened first
amendment rights, was broader than necessary to achieve its purpose.
C. The Arcara Decision
The Supreme Court in a 6-3 decision reversed the New York court
on both the prior restraint issue and application of the O'Brien test. On
the prior restraint issue, the Arcara Court held that the closure order
differed in two significant respects from an unconstitutional prior re-
straint under Near v. Minnesota.7 5 First, "the order would impose no
restraint at all on the dissemination of particular materials since re-
spondent is free to carry on his bookselling business at another loca-
tion, even if such locations are difficult to find," and second, "the
74. See infra note 89 (Court decisions upholding the constitutionality of license rev-
ocation laws based on illicit sexual activity).
75. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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closure order sought would not be imposed on the basis of an advance
determination that the distribution of particular materials in
prohibited."76
The Supreme Court further ruled that the O'Brien test is neither ap-
propriate nor applicable to such a closure order. Distinguishing prior
decisions, the Court found that the O'Brien test is appropriate only
when the regulated conduct has a significant expressive element, or
when regulation has the inevitable effect of singling out those engaged
in expressive activity.77 The Court found that neither situation existed
with respect to the closure order. Illicit sexual activity, the Court
stated, "manifests absolutely no element of protected expression,"78
and the closure law does not "inevitably single out bookstores or others
engaged in First Amendment protected activities."79 Pointing out that
"First Amendment values may not be invoked by merely linking the
words 'sex' and 'books'," 0 the Court noted that it had "not tradition-
ally subjected every criminal and civil sanction imposed through the
legal process to 'least restrictive means' scrutiny simply because each
particular remedy will have some effect on the First Amendment activ-
ities of those subject to sanction."81 In conclusion, the Court charac-
terized the law as a legitimate legislative attempt "to protect the
environment of the community by directing the sanction at premises
knowingly used for lawless activities."'82
The majority opinion by Chief Justice Burger and the concurring
opinion by Justice O'Connor noted that the situation would be quite
different if the defendant had been able to establish that enforcement of
the closure law was simply a pretext for a speech-suppressive motive or
policy.
In a sharp dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, argued that prior first amendment cases could not "be distin-
guished" as involving non-speech conduct "intimately related to ex-
pressive conduct."83 Finding that the closure law caused a substantial
infringement of first amendment rights, Justice Blackmun would have
76. 106 S. Ct. 3172, 3177 n.2 (1986).
77. Id. at 3177-78.




82. Id. at 3178.
83. Id. at 3179.
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ruled the closure order invalid under the O'Brien test because the
state's interest in controlling illicit sexual activity did not justify the
severe and unnecessary impact of a one-year closure on the first
amendment rights of a bookseller.84
D. Effect As Precedent
The Supreme Court's decision in Arcara holds that the first amend-
ment does not bar enforcement of a generally applicable nuisance clo-
sure law against adult uses based on knowing use of the premises for
illicit sexual activities. 5 According to the Court, such closure is
neither an impermissible prior restraint on protected speech nor other-
wise subject to first amendment scrutiny under the O'Brien "balanc-
ing" and "least restrictive" means tests.86 As precedent, the Arcara
decision affirms a number of recent state court decisions that uphold
the constitutionality of closure laws prohibiting illicit sexual activities
on the premises.8 7 Moreover, Arcara makes clear that even a remedy
as severe as a one-year closure of the entire premises of an adult use is
constitutionally permissible. 8 In addition, the Arcara decision pro-
vides some guidance to analyze the first amendment issues raised by
other forms of nuisance closure and license revocation laws.
1. License Revocation-Illicit Sexual Activity
Local ordinances may provide for revocation of a general business
license necessary to operate within a community when the premises are
used for illicit sexual activities. This sanction, which denies a business
the opportunity to thereafter reopen within the community, is obvi-
ously more severe than the location closure in Arcara. When such a
revocation ordinance is generally applicable to all businesses in the
city, courts have upheld their constitutionality as applied to adult uses,
ruling that the laws serve the substantial public purpose of preventing
84. Id. at 3180-81.
85. Id. at 3178.
86. Id. at 3175-77.
87. E.g., Commonwealth v. Croatan Books, Inc., 228 Va. 383, 323 S.E.2d 86 (1984);
Commonwealth ex rel. Lewis v. Allouwill Realty Corp., 330 Pa. Super. 32, 478 A.2d
1334 (1984); 660 Linbergh, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 492 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
88. In some cases, courts have hesitated to close down entire premises, but have
issued a closure order directed only at that part of the establishment where illicit sexual
activity has occurred. See College Art Theatres, Inc. v. DeCarlo, 476 So. 2d 40 (Ala.
1985) (ordering closure of mini-movies part of bookstore).
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the operation of businesses used for illegal activities.89
The Supreme Court's decision in Arcara affirms the rationale of
these decisions. On the prior restraint issue, license revocation laws
like the closure law in Arcara, which prohibit illicit sexual activity on
the premises, are not designed to restrain sexually explicit expression
and are not imposed "on the basis of an advance determination that the
distribution of particular materials is prohibited." Also, as in Arcara,
such license revocation laws should not be subject to first amendment
"least restrictive" scrutiny, because they are not based on conduct hav-
ing "a significant expressive element" and do not have "the inevitable
effect of singling out those engaged in expressive activity." Courts may
hold, as in Arcara, that the burden on protected expression resulting
from license revocation is simply a "speech-inhibiting consequence" of
a lawful civil remedy. 90
2. Nuisance Closure-Obscenity
Conflicting court decisions exist on the constitutionality of nuisance
closure laws based on the sale or exhibition of obscene materials on the
premises. While some courts have upheld such laws,9' most court de-
cisions have held the laws unconstitutional as prior restraints on pro-
tected speech or as unduly restrictive under the O'Brien test.92 On the
prior restraint issue, the Arcara decision suggests that, contrary to the
rationale of many recent court decisions, such closure laws may not be
properly characterized as impermissible prior restraints on protected
expression. As in Arcara, an owner is free to carry on his protected
expression at other locations in the community and the closure is not
imposed "on the basis of an advance determination that the distribu-
tion of particular materials is prohibited." 93 Obscenity-based closure
89. Iacobucci v. City of Newport, 785 F.2d 1354 (6th Cir.), rev'd, 107 S. Ct. 383(1986) (per curiam); Chulchian v. City of Indianapolis, 633 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1980);
Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
90. 106 S. Ct. at 3178 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
91. E.g., Fehlhaber v. North Carolina, 675 F.2d 1365 (4th Cir. 1982); State ex rel.
Kidwell v. U.S. Marketing, Inc., 102 Idaho 451, 631 P.2d 622 (1981), apeal dismissed
sub nom. U.S. Marketing, Inc. v. Idaho, 455 U.S. 1009 (1982).
92. E.g., Spokane Arcades, Inc. v. Brockett, 631 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 454
U.S. 1022 (1981); People ex rel. Bush v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550
P.2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); State v. A Motion
Picture Entitled "The Bet," 219 Kan. 64, 547 P.2d 760 (1976).
93. See also Note, Pornography, Padlocks, and Prior Restraints: The Constitutional
Limits of the Nuisance Power, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1478, 1489 (1983) (points out that
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laws, however, would clearly be subject to the O'Brien least restrictive
means test in view of the Arcara ruling as to when that test is triggered.
Obscenity-based closure laws, unlike the closure in Arcara, are obvi-
ously based on conduct such as the sale of books and exhibition of
movies that have a significant expressive element. These laws also sin-
gle out for regulation businesses engaged in protected expression. Nev-
ertheless, courts may uphold closure laws like the location ordinance in
the recent Supreme Court decision in City of Renton 94 on the ground
that such laws further a substantial public purpose and leave open rea-
sonable alternative locations for sexually explicit, protected expression
within the community. The Supreme Court has not strictly applied the
O'Brien test to location restrictions on adult uses. Instead, as in City of
Renton, the Court has applied the more lenient, "narrowly tailored"
standard that grants wide discretion to local communities in choosing
appropriate methods to implement legitimate state interests.95
The Supreme Court, after the City of Renton decision, might charac-
terize an obscenity-based closure law as imposing only an incidental
burden on protected expression.96 Also, the Court may, as it did with
respect to the location ordinance in City of Renton, refuse to second
guess the "wisdom or appropriateness" of closure as a remedy to sanc-
tion and deter the sale and exhibition of obscene materials. The burden
on protected expression that results from closure at a particular loca-
tion might simply be characterized as a "speech-inhibiting conse-
quence" of a lawful civil remedy.97
3. License Revocation-Obscenity
Courts have disagreed over the constitutionality of obscenity-based
license revocation laws. While some courts have upheld such laws,9 8
most recent court decisions indicate that obscenity-based license revo-
cation laws that have the effect of denying the owner the opportunity to
courts have assumed that obscenity-based nuisance closure laws are prior restraints
without engaging in substantive analysis of prior restraint doctrine).
94. 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986).
95. Id. at 931.
96. See City of Paducah v. Investment Entertainment, Inc., 791 F.2d 463, 469-70
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 316 (1986) (suggesting support for this analysis and
distinguishing obscenity based closure laws from more intrusive obscenity based license
revocatoin laws).
97. Arcara, 106 S. Ct. at 3178 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
98. E.g., West Gallery Corp. v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Comm'rs, 586 P.2d 429 (Utah
1978).
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operate within the community are most susceptible to judicial invalida-
tion.99 Such a law is likely to be held to violate the first amendment as
either an impermissible prior restraint on future expression or as an
intrusive and burdensome method of deterring obscenity. Unlike a lo-
cation restriction or closure law, a license revocation that bans future
sexually explicit expression by a business imposes more than an "inci-
dental burden" on protected expression, and may properly be subject
to heightened judicial scrutiny like the ban on live entertainment in
Schad." Unlike the closure law in Arcara, such a license revocation
law may be characterized not as a "speech-inhibiting consequence" of a
lawful civil remedy, but as an unduly intrusive remedy to sanction and
deter the distribution of obscene materials."0'
E. Comments
Arcara clearly holds that the first amendment is no impediment to
enforcement of nuisance closure laws that prohibit the use of premises
for illicit sexual activity. Moreover, the Arcara rationale suggests sup-
port for the constitutionality of generally applicable license revocation
laws as applied to adult uses, based on use of premises for illicit sexual
activity. Arcara may even be read, along with City of Renton, to sup-
port the constitutionality of nuisance closure laws based on obscenity.
Whether state and lower federal courts will interpret Arcara to support
the latter types of laws may well prove to be simply an academic ques-
tion in view of the availability of the remedy upheld in Arcara."'0
99. E.g., City of Paducah v. Investment Entertainment, Inc., 791 F.2d 463 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 316 (1986); Gayety Theatres, Inc. v. City of Miami, 719
F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1983); Cornflower Entertainment, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
485 F. Supp. 777 (D. Utah 1980).
100. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
101. The Supreme Court has indicated that the burden of supporting a prohibition
on a future exhibition of presumptively protected expression is even heavier than the
burden of justifying the imposition of a criminal sanction for past communication. See
Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1980).
102. Many states have so-called "Red Light Laws" similar to the closure law in-
volved in Arcara. Moreover, such laws may be enacted by local communities with state
home rule powers in other states.
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